IMPLEMENTING TITLE IX: THE HEW REGULATIONS
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, signed into
law on June 23, 1972, prohibits sex discrimination in education.I
This provision was enacted in response to extensive hearings
held by the House Special Subcommittee on Education, which
2
documented nationwide sex discrimination in education.
Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana urged his colleagues to take action in this area:
[O]ne of the great failings of the American educational
system is the continuation of corrosive and unjustified
discrimination against women. It is clear to me that sex
discrimination reaches into all facets of educationadmissions, scholarship programs, faculty hiring and
promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales. Indeed, the recent "Report on Higher Education"
concluded,
Discrimination against women, in contrast to
that against minorities, is still overt and socially
3
acceptable within the academic community.
The main provision of Title IX is an absolute prohibition,
similar to that of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:4 "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .. ."5 Regulations implementing Title IX, promulgated by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, became effective on July 21, 1975.6
Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 36 Stat. 373, (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-86 (Supp. II, 1972)).
2Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before a Special Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
3 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
442 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
5 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. II, 1972). Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
forbids discrimination on the ground of race, color, or national origin in any program
receiving federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
6 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975). HEW spent two years preparing the Title IX implementing regulations. On June 20, 1974, the Office of Civil Rights presented its proposed
regulations. 39 Fed. Reg. 22228 (1974). In order to accommodate the expected flood of
reaction from educational institutions and women's groups, comments were accepted
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This comment will first develop from the legislative history,
from executive and judicial interpretation of Tides VI and VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 and from relevant constitutional
adjudication, a framework with which to approach Tide IX. The
framework will then be applied to evaluate the HEW regulations
as an implementation of the mandate of Tide IX in the substantive areas of admissions and recruitment, access to classes and
activities, behavior and appearance rules, use of marital or parental status, facilities, and athletics.

I.

THE STATUTE

The absolute prohibition of section 901(a) of Tide IX,8 is

followed by several exceptions relating to admissions. 9 Section
901(a) applies only to vocational, professional and graduate
schools, and public undergraduate schools.' 0 Public undergraduate schools that have had a continual tradition from
their establishment of admitting only students of one sex are exempted from the prohibition against sex discrimination in
admissions." Once a student is admitted, however, there can be
no sex-based discrimination.' 2 Educational institutions run by
religious organizations are exempted insofar as application of
Title IX would be inconsistent with the religious tenets of the
organization.' 3 A complete exemption from the statute is provided educational institutions whose primary purpose is training
through October 15, 1974. Id. 22231. Over 9,700 comments were received by the Department. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000e (1970).
8 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. II, 1972); text accompanying note 5 supra.
9 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(1), (5) (Supp. II, 1972):
(1) In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall apply
only to institutions of vocational education, professional education, and
graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher
education;
(5) In regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any public institution
of undergraduate higher education which is an institution that traditionally and
continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of
one sex.
For a section by section analysis of the statute in light of its legislative history, see Buek &
Orleans, Sex Discrimination-A Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the
EducationAmendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
10 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
11 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(5) (Supp. II, 1972); see Shelton & Berndt, Sex Discriminationin
Vocational Education:Title IX and Other Remedies, 62 CAUIF. L. REv. 1121 (1974).
12 HEW FACT SHEET 3 (June, 1975).
13 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
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individuals for the military services. 14 Section 901(b) is an antiquota provision:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section
shall be interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State,
5
section, or other area ....
The only other exception to the absolute prohibition is section 907: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this chapter, nothing contained herein shall be construed to
prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this
Act, from maintaining separate living facilities for the different
16
sexes."'
On December 31, 1974, section 90117 was amended to exempt fraternities, sororities, and youth service organizations
from the prohibitions of Title IX.' 8 The amendment resulted
from the flood of objections received by HEW 19 to section
86.31(b)(7) of the proposed regulations, which would have left
open the possibility of educational institutions losing their federal funds if found substantially to support an organization that
discriminates by sex.20 This newest amendment and the admissions exemptions reflect the ambivalence of the Congress in its
1Id. § 1681(a)(4).
15 1d. § 1681(b).
Is Id.§ 1686.
17
Id. § 1681(a).
" Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862, amending 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (Supp. II, 1972).
19N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 4 (city ed.).
'0 39 Fed.Reg. 22235 (1974):
86.31 Education programs and activities:
(b) [A] recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
(7) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against any person by assisting any
agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex
in providing any aid, benefit or service to students ....
Senator Bayh, the primary Senate sponsor of Title IX, 117 CoNG. REc. 30155 (1971),
proposed the new amendment to make explicit what he considered Congress' intent that
the Act not extend to such organizations. 120 CONG. REc. 21567-68 (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1974). There was no problem in getting it passed by the House, because a House conference report had attempted to achieve the same objective by generating legislative history
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attempt to abolish the most harmful effects of sex discrimination
while responding to political pressure to keep the status quo in
1
some areas.

2

Section 902 of Title IX 2 2 provides enforcement machinery
identical to that of section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,23 but limited to education programs or activities. Each
department and agency empowered to extend federal financial
assistance is directed to issue rules and regulations to implement
the statute. If after a hearing it is determined that a recipient is
not complying with the rules and that future compliance cannot
be effected on a voluntary basis, compliance may be enforced
through termination of funds or refusal to grant further assistance. A department that takes such action must file a written
report with the committees of the House and Senate having
legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved. Judicial review is authorized by section 903,24 again in language
25
almost identical to that of Title VI.

II.

ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE

Discrimination against female students in education has
taken many and varied forms. It has ranged from overt exclusion from particular classes such as shop, to more subtle discrimination such as inculcation of limited career orientations in
female students. This diversity in modes of discrimination necessitates an assessment of the intended scope of Title IX. Is every
classification by sex impermissible? Does the statute reach
practices that are facially neutral but have a disparate effect
on one sex? To what extent is separate but equal a permissible
alternative?

to defeat HEW's interpretation of Title IX. 120 CONG. REC. 11106-07 (daily ed. Nov. 26,
1974).
Representative Green of Oregon, the author of the statute, 117 CONG. REc. 9822
(1971), put into the CongressionalRecord on Nov. 26, 1974, the substance of the recommendation of the House conference report: "[Title IX] was never designed for the
purpose of having the Federal Government intrude on private organizations and to force
by Government fiat the integration of such groups as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts .... and all
sororities and fraternities." 120 CONG. REc. 11106 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974) (remarks of
Representative Green). Representative Green suggested other changes in the proposed
HEW regulations that will be discussed below. See text accompanying notes 78-229 infra.
2
, See Buek & Orleans, supra note 9.
22 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. II, 1972).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
24 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (Supp. II, 1972).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1970).
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A. Overt Discrimination
The practices most obviously covered by Title IX involve
overtly different treatment of male and female students. Some
elementary schools forbid girls to join the safety patrol. Colleges
and universities often prescribe earlier curfews for women than
for men. Vocational interest tests have been color coded pink
and blue with different career choices for women and men. All
of these are examples of explicit discrimination based on sex,
prohibited by Title IX. Educational institutions should not be
allowed to justify such overtly different treatment. When schools
make explicit rules according to sex, Title IX's prohibition
should be applied absolutely, with
a narrow reading of section
26
907's "living facilities" exception.
The legislative history of the statute is not particularly instructive on this interpretive question. Most of the congressional
debate focused on the admissions exceptions that eventually became part of Title IX. 2 7 At one point in the debates, however,
Senator Bayh referred to Title IX as a "narrower embodiment"
of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which Congress had
recently sent to the states for ratification.2 8 The Senate Report
on the ERA interprets it as an absolute prohibition of overtly
different treatment on the basis of sex . 2 No justification by a
state would be accepted for overtly disparate treatment under
the ERA, and none should be accepted under Title IX.
Executive construction of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,30 forbidding discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in any program receiving federal financing, also
supports an absolute reading of the statute. 3 1 Caution should be
exercised, however, since Congress did not limit the effect of
Title VI in any way, whereas Title IX has elaborate admissions
exemptions and a living facilities exception. Congress obviously
does not see race and sex discrimination in exactly the same way.
One cannot conceive that Congress would enact a statute allowing higher admissions standards for blacks than whites in the
interest of permitting educational institutions to determine the
optimal environment for learning. Nor could money be allotted
2620 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
27
See, e.g. 118 CONG. REC. 5812-15 (1972); 117 id. 30408-12, 39248-61 (1971).
28 117 CONG. REc. 30414 (1971) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
29S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972); see Brown, Emerson, Falk &
Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasisfor Equal Rights for Women,
80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
3042 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1970).
1 See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (1974).
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to a state system of education in which one school specializing in
engineering and science admitted whites only, while another
school, set up for blacks, taught only auto mechanics and
maintenance work. That is just what the admission exemptions
in Title IX allow. Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that
because Congress was willing to write in certain exemptions, it
did not intend the statute absolutely to prohibit overt sex-based
discrimination in the areas not excepted. One might ask whether
differences in treatment allowed by the HEW regulations to
Title IX would be valid under Title VI, and, if not, whether
sex should be viewed differently from race in that particular
situation.
An absolute reading of the statute must take account of
section 907, which allows "separate living facilities for the different sexes. ' 32 The term "living facilities" may include restrooms,
lockers, and other school areas where disrobing takes place; but
to extend the term any further would frustrate Congress' attempt to give women equal educational opportunity. 33 A narrow
reading of section 907 also conforms to the privacy exception to
the ERA, on which much of the legislative history of that
amendment is premised. 34 The source of this implied exception
is the constitutional right of privacy enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut3 5 and Roe v. Wade.3 6 The Senate
Report on the ERA indicates that the right of privacy exception
extends only to separate restrooms and sleeping quarters.3 7 Such
should also be the limit of the explicit exception of section 907 of
Title IX.
The narrow reading given to the "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ) exception to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196438 also supports a similar approach under Title IX.
Title VII forbids discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 39 Such discrimination may be made, however, "in those certain instances where
32

20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).

33 Support for a narrow reading of the exception can be found in the Supreme

Court's construction of the Fair Labor Standards Act § 13(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2)
(1970), in A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945). "To extend an exemption
to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the
interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people." Id. at 493.
34 See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
35 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31 See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
3
9 Id. § 2000e-2.
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religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. ' 40 In Title VII as in Title IX, a
general prohibition is qualified by a single exception.
Both the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission have allowed very few employers to justify different
treatment based explicitly on sex under the BFOQ exception.
One court held that "sexual characteristics, rather than characteristics that might, to one degree or another, correlate with a
particular sex" are the only basis for applying the BFOQ
exception. 4 1 Thus, wet nurses and sperm donors are two of the
few occupations that would fit such a narrow reading. Another
court imposed on the employer the "burden of proving that he
had reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved. 42
In summary, the legislative histories of Title IX and of the
ERA and executive and judicial construction of Titles VI and
VII support an analysis of Title IX which absolutely proscribes
explicitly different treatment of students according to sex, except in the area of living facilities.
Facially Neutral Regulations Having a
DiscriminatoryEffect
Some school policies and regulations do not refer explicitly
to male and female students and thus appear to be nondiscriminatory. Their effect, however, often is to burden female
students. Restrictions on part-time attendance at colleges or universities is an example. Although applicable to men and women,
women with young children feel the impact of this policy much
more than male students, because of the inadequacy of child
care facilities in this country. Schools often follow admissions
policies that give preference to students from certain schools. If
those schools are single-sex institutions, the college in effect discriminates against the sex excluded from the favored single-sex
institution.
Title IX is broad enough to cover facially neutral practices
having a disparate impact on women. However, the educational
institutions should be allowed to justify the necessity of such
practices in relation to the objectives of the educational program.
B.

40

1d. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971).
42 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
41 Rosenfeld
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Such an interpretation of the statute is supported by parallel
decisions under Tides VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 43 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 4 4 the Supreme Court examined neutrally stated employment procedures that were
found disproportionately to disqualify blacks. The Court held
that the requirement of a high school education or the passing of
a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment could be sustained only if it had a "manifest relationship" to success in the job. 45 Lack of discriminatory intent was
irrelevant; the effect of the policy triggered application of
Tide VII.
A similarly broad definition of discrimination was applied in
Lau v. Nichols.46 In Lau, Chinese speaking students alleged that
the school system violated their rights under Title VI by failing
to teach them English. The Court decided that regardless of
intent, this failure amounted to discrimination based on national
origin prohibited by Title VI. As in Griggs, effect was all important. It was not enough that all students were provided with the
"same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum, for students
who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from
any meaningful education. '4 7 Lau and Griggs both suggest that a
facially neutral requirement that is applied to all candidates for
admission/to a school or activity will be held to be discriminatory
if its effect is to burden a protected group. 48 Thus even facially
neutral policies and regulations may be within the regulatory
power of HEW under Tide IX. A rule or practice having a
disparate impact on women should be allowed only if the school
shows "educational necessity"-that the goal sought by the facially neutral but effectively discriminatory rule cannot be
achieved in any other manner.
C. Regulations Concerning Unique Physical
Characteristics
enact
rules based on physical characterisSchools sometimes
tics unique to one sex or the other. It must be asked whether,
and if so, under what circumstnaces, Tide IX forbids such rules.
Pregnancy is usually the characteristic at issue. Both the Equal
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000e (1970).
44 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45 Id. at 432.
46414 U.S. 563 (1974).
47 414 U.S. at 566.
48
See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
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Employment Opportunity Commission regulations under Title
VII,4 9 and the HEW regulations implementing Title IX, 50 apply
to various practices of employers and schools relative to pregnant women. A federal district court recently held that an
employer's disparate treatment of pregnant employees was not
cognizable under Title VII. 5 1 In so holding the court relied on
footnote twenty in Geduldig v. Aiello, 5 2 where the Supreme Court,
in holding that California's disability insurance program did not
violate the equal protection clause, rejected the contention that
the pregnancy classification there involved was sex-based. The
district court considered the definition of discrimination based
on sex to be the same under the fourteenth amendment and
under Title VII, and therefore considered
itself bound by the
53
Supreme Court's analysis in Aiello.
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the district court's
analysis, admonishing the court for reading the Aiello language
out of the factual context in which it was used, 5 4 and holding
that in implementing Tide VII the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is not bound by the narrow fourteenth
amendment definition of sex-based classifications suggested in
Aiello.5 5 This broader view is consistent with the approach taken
in Lau and Griggs.5 6 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in
Lau, indicated that although section 601 of Tide VI, standing
alone, might not have called for a judgment against the school
districts, HEW interpretations of the section required the
decision. 57 He relied on an earlier decision of the Court to hold
"that the validity of a regulation promulgated under a general
authorization provision such as § 602 of Tide VI 'will be sustained so long as it is reasonably related to the purposes of the

4929 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1974).

1040 Fed. Reg. 24137-44 (1975); see text accompanying notes 170-81 infra.
51Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 F. Supp.
679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No. 74-160 1).
52417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974).
53379 F. Supp. at 682.
54Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024,
1028-30 (2d Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert.fided, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19, 1975) (No.
74-1601).
55Id. at 1030-32. "There is," the court noted, "no requirement that the discriminatory practices forbidden by this statute should be limited to practices violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. Practices forbidden by Title VII and the EEOC guidelines issued
thereunder may, nonetheless, be able to survive Equal Protection attack." Id. at 1031.
56
See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
51414 U.S. at 570-71 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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enabling legislation.' ",58 In Griggs, the Court noted that such
'59
agency interpretations are entitled to "great deference.
This criterion should also be used to evaluate the regulations issued under Title IX. What the Court said in Aiello in the
context of fourteenth amendment litigation should not limit
HEW's attempt to enforce remedial legislation. That a pregnancy classification is not sex-based for fourteenth amendment
purposes does not foreclose the constitutional claim, but merely
shifts the analysis from the greater burden of justification required for sex-based discrimination by Reed v. Reed 60 and Fron62
tiero v. Richardson,61 to the traditional "rational basis" analysis.
In the same way, such classifications will be examined under
Title IX and will be permitted if educational necessity can be
demonstrated. But the failure of a pregnancy classification to
constitute a sex-based classification for fourteenth amendment
purposes and the possibility that it can be justified by a showing
of educational necessity should not be relevant to the initial question of the cognizability under Title IX of an attack on the
regulation.
D.

The Separate But Equal Doctrine

Pervading the statutory analysis suggested above is the
spectre of the "separate but equal" doctrine. When may an educational institution fulfill its obligations under Title IX by providing separate but equal programs or activities? Proponents of
the ERA suggest that under that amendment there is no place
for separate but equal. "It would simply operate to perpetuate a
dual system of equality, different but not equal. Essentially the
58Id. at 571 (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356,
369 (1973) (footnote omitted)).
59 401 U.S. at 434. In Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), petitionfor cert.filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3067 (U.S. June 19,
1975) (No. 74-1601), the Second Circuit in part relied on the deference to be accorded
agency interpretations of its statutory mandate to hold that the Supreme Court had not
intended, contrary to the district court's holding, to imply that is Aiello footnote would
invalidate EEOC regulations broader than the narrow fourteenth amendment definition
of sex-based discrimination there articulated. 513 F.2d at 1030.
60 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

61411 U.S. 677 (1973).
62 In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute
that gave an automatic preference to males in granting letters of administration. Evidencing a sensitivity to the sex classification without finding it a "suspect" classification, the
Court found the statute to be without rational basis. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973), struck down federal statutes wherein the procedures for claiming one's
spouse as a dependent varied between servicemen and servicewomen. Four members of
the Court found sex a "suspect" classification while three did not reach that issue since
they found the scheme irrational under traditional equal. protection analysis.
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separate-but-equal doctrine is a device for keeping one group in
a subordinate position.... Experience has shown, furthermore,
that in practice separate-but-equal is rarely in fact equal." 63 If it
can be shown that a separate program is not equal, there is no
question that Title IX is violated. Where the tangible aspects
of separate programs for females and males are arguably equal,
however, the long tradition of separation of the sexes militates
against an automatic rejection of the concept.
An attempt to assess the place of separate but equal under
Title IX must begin by looking to the analysis of Brown v. Board
of Education6 4 that caused the Supreme Court to denounce separation of the races. It might be argued that separation of the
sexes is not based on a judgment of inferiority, as was racial
segregation, but rather on a conception of the different, complementary roles of women and men. It is, however, just that
assumption and inculcation of role that is at the heart of
sex discrimination in education. 6 5 Only recently has this
"equalitarian veneer" been put on the system that has channeled
women into a single career while men have been encouraged to
reach their educational and career potentials. 6 In addition to
effect on motivation is the even sadder loss of self-esteem occasioned by sex segregation. One elementary school girl wrote in
a letter: "Dear God, Are boys better than girls? I know you are
one, but please try to be fair. ' 67 Although this sense of inferiority and development of sex roles has taken place frequently in
integrated environments, it is certainly exacerbated by overt
separation.
It has been suggested that Supreme Court cases antedating
Brown might be used for guidance in evaluating separate activities within schools. In Sweatt v. Painter,68 the Court ordered
the University of Texas Law School to admit a black student
because its legal education was superior to that of a state law
school established for blacks.
[T]he University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of
63 Brown, supra note 29, at 902.
64 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
's See, e.g., Bern & Bern, Case Study of a Nonconscious Ideology: Training the Woman to
Know Her Place, printed in 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1042; Comment, Teaching
Woman Her Place: The Role of Public Education in the Development of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191 (1973).
66 See Bern & Bem, supra note 65, at 1043.
67 Comment, supra note 65, at 1191.
68 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few, include
reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in
69
the community, traditions and prestige.
The decision of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents70 also involved the separate but equal doctrine, but within a single educational institution. The Court held that forcing a black student to
sit apart in the classroom, cafeteria, and library impaired "his
ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with
other students... .'-71 Buck and Orleans, HEW lawyers, consider
' 72
these cases "entirely apposite to Title IX.
They dictate that where separate treatment on the basis
of sex is proposed by an entity subject to Title IX, all
indicia must indicate that full experiential equality is
accorded those who will be affected. Put slightly differently, the treatment proposed must be such as demonstrably would not affect a student or employee's "free
choice" among the separate activities, were sex not a
factor.
• . . In the multitude of practices subject to this
provision, simply the possibility of substantive inequalities, including those derived from the fact of
isolation itself, gives
rise to a presumption against
73
separate treatment.
If Title IX is to have its intended remedial effect there must
be a presumption against separate treatment of females and
males. The reasons asserted for the separate treatment should be
relevant to a determination of its acceptability uder Title IX.
One reason that might be asserted as a justification for separate
treatment is the explicit living facilities exception of section
907,74 or what the educational entity might think a proper extension of that exception. Also, separate but equal treatment
might be necessary at times to forestall an attack by female students under Lau and Griggs.75 For example, it could be argued
that opening all competitive athletic teams to female students
69

Id. at 634.
70339 U.S. 637 (1950).
71
1d. at 641.
72 Buek & Orleans, supra note 9, at 19.
73 Id.

74 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
" See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
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without any separate athletic program for them would effectively
shut out the great majority of women from competitive athletics.
They would then receive less benefits than their male counterparts in much the same way as the Chinese-speaking students
were discriminated against in Lau.76 A final possible reason
school officials might advance for separate programs is the belief
that girls learn differently than boys and, therefore, need different environments in which to reach their potentials. Educational
authorities could be marshalled on both sides of this issue in the
same way the medical authorities contradicted each other in the
early sports cases.7 7 Because of the risk that young girls will be
channelled into a stereotype of one preparing for very limited
future activity and will thereby suffer the sense of inferiority
noted in Brown, this last rationale should be accorded no place
under Title IX.
Separate but equal treatment should be permitted only
when an educational entity is within the narrowly interpreted
living facilities exception discussed above, or when there is proof
that without a separate activity, female students will be, in effect,
foreclosed from meaningful particpation in the activity and thus
discriminated against in the sense recognized in Lau.
III. THE REGULATIONS
The principles developed in the preceding paragraphs provide a framework against which to assess the effectiveness of
regulations promulgated by HEW as an implementation of the
policy of Title IX. The regulations, finalized as Part 86 of Title
45 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 78 consist of Subparts A
through F. 79 This Comment will not deal with Subpart E (Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Employment in Educational
Programs)" ° or with Subpart F (Procedures).8 ' The discussion
will focus on Subparts C (Admission and Recruitment) 2 and D
(Discrimination in Programs and Activities), 3 both of which reSee text accompanying notes 207-08 infra.
Compare Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 473 (D.R.I. 1974),
rev'd, 514 F.2d 344 (Ist Cir. 1975) and Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F.
Supp. 1212 (W.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1974), with NOW, Essex
County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974).
78 40 Fed. Reg. 24128-24145 (1975).
76

7

79

80

Id. 24137.

Id. 24143-44.

81 Id. 24144. For proposed consolidated procedural regulations for Title IX and

other8 civil rights laws see id. 24148.
2 Id. 24140.
83
Id. 24140-43.
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late directly to the treatment of students. The introductory and
coverage sections will be examined only briefly.
A. Subparts A and B: Introduction and Coverage
The introduction to the regulations defines terms and explains when remedial and affirmative action and assurances of
compliance are required. 84 Most of the section is a straightforward application of the statute. The coverage regulations also
adhere closely to the statute and, therefore, are not a source of
controversy. The coverage section establishes procedures to
assure that the section 901(a)(3) 85 exemption for educational institutions of religious organizations is narrowly limited. If a religious institution wishes to claim that certain guidelines are inconsistent with its religious tenets, it must set forth in writing to
the Director of the Office for Civil Rights the extent of the
requested exemption and a copy of the religious tenets under
86
which the exemption is claimed.
B. Subpart C: Admission and Recruitment
After a general prohibition of sex discrimination in admissions, Subpart C delineates specific prohibitions such as ranking
separately on the basis of sex, and the use of quotas.8 7 The use
of separate rankings of male and female applicants as a means to
enforce higher admissions standards for women has been attacked successfully under the rational basis test of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 88 This is a blatant
form of admissions discrimination and certainly violates Title IX.
The quota system was specifically mentioned in the legislative
89
history as a practice prohibited by the statute.
In language similar to that used by the Court in Griggs,9" the
regulations forbid the use of
any test or other criterion for admission which has a
disproportionately adverse effect on persons on the
8

4Id. 24137-39.
8520 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (Supp. II, 1972).
80
40 Fed. Reg. 24139, § 86.12 (1975).
87
Id. 24140, § 86.21(a), (b).
88 In Bray v. Lee, 337 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1972), the Boston Latin School was
forbidden to demand higher admission test scores from girls than from boys. Berkelman
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1974), disallowed the same
practice by a college preparatory high school.
8
9See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 5812 (1972) (remarks of Senator Beall).
90 Text accompanying note 44 supra.
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basis of sex unless the use of such test or criterion is
shown to predict validly success in the education program or activity in question and alternative tests or
criteria which do not have such a disproportionately
adverse effect are shown to be unavailable. 91
The regulations do not prohibit other practices neutral on their
face but having a disparate impact on the protected class, such as
restrictions on age or part-time attendance. The Women's Equity
Action League and Representative Bella Abzug prepared a preliminary analysis of the regulations, 92 recommending prohibition
of such policies. 93 A broader attack on such procedures is within
HEW's province and would increase the effectiveness of the
regulations in eradicating all forms of sex discrimination in
admissions.
Also forbidden in admissions procedures is any rule or policy concerning marital or parental status of students which operates to exclude members of one sex.9 4 Pregnancy and related
conditions are to be treated as any other temporary disability or
physical condition.9 5 According to the analysis suggested above,
rules dealing with pregnancy should be considered within the
regulatory power of HEW even though based on a physical
characteristic unique to one sex. 96 The school must show educational necessity to justify different treatment of pregnant
women. Such a showing probably cannot be made with respect to
admissions policies that discriminate on the basis of marital or
parental status.
Section 86.22 covers another method by which sex discrimination has been achieved in admissions. It prohibits schools from
giving "preference to applicants for admission, on the basis of
attendance at any educational institution . . . which admits as
students predominantly members of one sex, if the giving of
such preference has the effect of discriminating on the basis of
9140 Fed. Reg. 24140, § 86.21(b)(2) (1975).
92 WEAL-ABZUG PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF

PROPOSED TITLE

IX

REGULATIONS,

re-

printed in 120 CONG. REC. E 4863-69 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
93Id. 4865.
9 40 Fed. Reg. 24140, § 86.21(c) (1975). Perhaps enforcement of this regulation
could be facilitated by providing that requests for information concerning marital or
parental status cannot be included on applications for admission.
9SId. § 86.21(c)(3): "A recipient . . . shall treat disabilities related to pregnancy,
childbirth, termination of pregnancy, or recovery therefrom in the same manner and
under the same policies as any other temporary disability or physical condition ......
" See text accompanying notes 49-62 supra.
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sex ...."97 However, the introductory remarks put a gloss on the
section.
Such preferences may be permissible . . .if the granting institution can show that the pool of applicants eligible for such preferences includes roughly equivalent
numbers of males and females, or if it can show that the
total number of applicants eligible to receive preferences is insignificant
in comparison with its total ap98
plicant pool.

The subpart on admissions ends with a command that recruitment be directed equally to both sexes and a warning
against primary or exclusive recruitment from single-sex or predominantly single-sex institutions.99
C.

Subpart D: Programsand Activities

1. Education Programs and Activities
Subpart D of the regulations, containing the substantive
guidelines for treatment of students within the schools, is the
principal focus of this Comment. It should be emphasized that
the subpart D regulations apply to all educational institutions
receiving federal financial assistance; the admissions exemptions
stop once the student is accepted. 10 0 A general prohibition of
discrimination under any "academic, extracurricular, research,
occupational training, or other educational program or activity,"
is followed by specific prohibitions. 10 1 Neither aid, benefit, nor
service can be denied, or given in a different manner or under a
97 40 Fed. Reg. 24140, § 86.22 (1975); see id. § 86.23(b).
98

1d. 24130.
Id. 24140, § 86.23.
100See text accompanying notes 9-12 supra.
10140 Fed. Reg. 24140-41, §§ 86.31(a), (b) (1975):

99

86.31 Education programs and activities.
(a) General. Except as provided elsewhere in this part, no person shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any academic, extracurricular, research,
occupational training, or other education program or activity operated by a
recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance. This subpart does not apply to actions of a recipient in connection with admission of its
students to an education program or activity of (1) a recipient to which Subpart
C does not apply, or (2) an entity, not a recipient, to which Subpart C would not
apply if the entity were a recipient.
(b) Specific prohibitions. Except as provided in this subpart, in providing any
aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex:
(1) Treat one person differently from another in determining whether
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different set of requirements, on the basis of sex.10 2 All clubs
and service organizations conducted by the school must be open
to women and men. Girls must be allowed to participate in such
activities as safety patrol.' 0 3 Recreational opportunities also must
be equalized. The following practices are open to attack under
these guidelines.
At one Ohio institution a woman could not use the
handball courts unless a male signed up for her.
At a large midwestern university, the intramural
pool was specifically reserved for "Faculty, Administrative Staff and Male Students" for approximately two
hours each day. That is, this was a time for men only.' 0 4
An educational institution may not on the basis of sex
"[s]ubject any person to separate or different rules of behavior,
sanctions or other treatment."' 0 5 No longer may a school have
different curfew requirements for women and men. Such regulations previously withstood equal protection challenges.10 6
such person satisfies any requirement or condition for the provision of such aid,
benefit, or service;
(2) Provide different aid, benefits, or services or provide aid, benefits, or
services in a different manner;
(3) Deny any person any such aid, benefit, or service;
(4) Subject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions,
or other treatment;
(5) Discriminate against any person in the application of any rules of appearance;
(6) Apply any rule concerning the domicile or residence of a student or
applicant, including eligibility for in-state fees and tuition;
(7) Aid or perpetuate discrimination against any person by providing significant assistance to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on
the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit or service to students or employees;
(8) Otherwise limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity.
102
Id. §§ 86.31 (b)(1), (2), (3).
103 For a discussion of recommended changes in this area and others,
see K.
DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED
DISCRIMINATION (1974) [hereinafter cited as DAVIDSON].
104 PROJECT

ON

THE

STATUS

AND

EDUCATION

OF WOMEN,

WHAT

CONSTITUTES

EQUALITY FOR WOMEN IN SPORT? 5 (April, 1974).
105 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(4) (1975).

106An attack on such a regulation under the equal protection clause failed in Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 982 (1974), in
which the Sixth Circuit found a rational relationship between the regulation and the
State's legitimate safety objective. However, it is arguable that even under present equal
protection standards, such a regulation should fall. Although the objective of protecting
female students is commendable and to be encouraged, such a sweeping regulation goes
beyond the Reed test of a "substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). When a right as important as freedom of movement is at
stake and the rule is so over-inclusive, the school should be required to pursue its
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Also specifically forbidden is discrimination "in the application of any rules of appearance."' 1 0 7 Presumably girls must now
be allowed to wear pants, and boys must be permitted to wear
their hair as long as they wish. It is difficult to know how much
further the rule will or should go. In analogous Title VII litigation, courts have struck down differing rules for hair length but
have sustained those for beards. 10 8 Since women cannot grow
beards, they were considered a sex-specific characteristic and not
within the purview of the statute. This Comment contends, however, that all "appearance" rules should be scrutinized under
Title IX, but should be allowed to stand if educational necessity
can be shown. 10 9 In defending due process challenges to dress
codes" schools have attempted to show that certain hair styles
for men disrupt school activities. Courts have divided on this
issue. Some have held that freedom to wear one's hair as one
wishes is within the concept of liberty."' Others have either
abstained" 2 or sustained the regulation as a reasonable effort to
maintain order in the schools that does not infringe any constitutional right." 3 The regulation's general prohibition permits an
appropriately flexible approach to evaluating school rules in this
area.
A school may no longer apply any sex-differentiated
domicile or residency rule in providing any aid, benefit, or service to a studeiit." 4 The Secretary's introductory remarks to the
proposed regulations make clear that the Department is concerned in this area with eligibility for in-state tuition fees.

objective through more narrowly drawn means. Dormitory curfews are easier to implement than would be more narrowly drawn regulations, but administrative convenience
should not save a classification based on sex. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
107 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(5) (1975).
108E.g., Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972).
109
See text accompanying notes 49-62 supra.
110 E.g., Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist. 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 979 (1971); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (Ist Cir. 1970); Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp.
550 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Rumler v. Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C.
1971).
1I Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d
1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
112 Press v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
113 King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 979 (1971); Rumler v. Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971).
114 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(6) (1975).
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"[M]any educational institutions base their determinations of
eligibility for in-state tuition on domicile; applicable state law
may require a married woman to take the domicile of her husband as of the date of marriage, or further require a year of
residency to demonstrate domicile." 1 5 This kind of rule operates in favor of the female student attending school in her
husband's domicile, but against the one whose school is located
in her pre-marital domicile. Application of such a rule in either
instance is now prohibited. HEW is clearly implementing the
mandate of Title IX in this regard. A federal district court recently held that application of such a rule by Pennsylvania state
universities violates the equal protection clause.16 The court was
struck by the fact that there was "no rule ...to tie the residency
classification of any group other
than married women to the
' 7
classification of someone else."
Section 86.31(b)(7)"18 provides that a recipient of federal
funds shall not "[a]id or perpetuate discrimination against any
person by providing significant assistance to any agency, organization, or person which discriminates on the basis of sex in providing any aid, benefit, or service to students or employees
...."'9 Sororities, fraternities, and youth service organizations
such as the Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts successfully lobbied for
the amendment exempting them from this provision. 20 The
amendment may have been unnecessary under the proposed
regulations, the introduction to which stated:
Among the criteria to be considered in each case are the
substantiality of the relationship between the recipient
subject to the regulation and the other party involved,
including the financial support by the recipient, and
whether the other party's activities relate so closely to
the recipient's educational program or activity, or to
students or employees in that program, that they fairly
should2 1 be considered as activities of the recipient
itself.'
"1 39 Fed. Reg. 22229 (1974).
116Samuel v.University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed,
506 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1974).
117d. at 1131.
118 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(7) (1975). This section was severely critized in the
letters received by HEW after the announcement of the proposed regulations. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 3.
11940 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(b)(7) (1975).
120See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
121 39 Fed. Reg. 22229 (1974).
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In explaining the final regulations, HEW writes, "[s]uch forms of
assistance to discriminatory groups as faculty sponsors, facilities,
administrative staff, etc., may be significant enough to render
the organization subject to the . . . regulation.' 1 22 The use of
school facilities will involve the most difficult determinations.
HEW's approach in the final regulations 1 23 can be criticized for
allowing any use of school facilities by sex-restricted organizations. The language of Title IX is absolute. The right of privacy
is not at issue. Use of facilities is not restricted to discriminatory
organizations whose "discrimination" might be justified by educational necessity. 1 24 Under the approach taken in this Comment
the discrimination potentially tolerated by this section cannot be
justified.
The WEAL-Abzug report correctly points out that the language of section 86.31(b)(7) prohibits recipients from assisting
only those organizations that provide a benefit or service to
students. 125 Such single-sex organizations as the Junior Chamber
of Commerce and Little League (while it remained single sex),
which fall outside that qualification, could take advantage of
school property and services without the intervention of
HEW.' 26 Such a loophole in the regulations is in conflict with the
broad construction of the statute suggested by Griggs and Lau.
Section 86.31 ends with the regulation of programs not operated by the recipient in which students or employees of the
recipient are required or permitted to participate, including
"educational consortia and cooperative employment and
student-teaching assignments."' 1 27 The recipient must develop a
procedure to ensure that the operator of the program takes no
action in regard to students or employees which the recipient
would be forbidden to take.' 28 If the recipient cannot ensure
non-discrimination by the operator, it must dissociate itself from
the program. 29 This is a commendable attempt by the Department to reach less direct but nonetheless destructive discrimina:
tion encountered by women in education.

122HEW FACT SHEET 7 (June, 1975).
123 Text accompanying note 122 supra.

124 See text accompanying notes 44-62 supra.
125 WEAL-ABZUG PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TITLE IX REGULATIONS, re-

printed in 120 CONG. REC. E 4866 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
126 Id.
127 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.31(d)(1) (1975).
128 Id. § 86.31(d)(2)(i).
129
Id. § 86.31(d)(2)(ii).
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2. Housing and Other Facilities
The housing regulations are a straightforward implementation of section 907, which allows schools to maintain separate
living facilities for the sexes. 130 The separate housing for females
and males must be proportionate in quantity and quality, 13 1 governed by non-discriminatory rules, and subject to the same
fees.' 32 If the institution is involved in any way in off campus
housing, it must take reasonable action to assure itself that such
housing of equal quantity, quality, and cost is available to women
and to men.' 33 The next section permits separate but comparable toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of
sex. 134 This interpretation comports
with the rationale underly35
ing the living facilities exception.
3.

Integration of Courses

The provision for equal access to educational programs or
activities is controversial. "A recipient shall not provide any
course or otherwise carry out any of its education program or
activity separately on the basis of sex,... including health, physical education, industrial, business, vocational, technical, home
economics, music, and adult education courses."'1 3 6 The two most
heatedly discussed aspects of this regulation are the possible integration of sex education and physical education classes.' 3 7 Sex
education classes were specifically exempted in July, 1974,138 but
gym classes must be integrated.
It is difficult to reconcile the sex education exemption with a
general rejection of the separate-but-equal doctrine. 3 9 It might
be argued that the right of privacy justifies this exemption.
However, discussion of sexual matters is far different from the
type of sexual activity protected by Griswold and Roe.' 40 Neither
130 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. II, 1972).
13140 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.32(b) (1975).
132
Id. § 86.32(a).
133
Id.§ 86.32(c).
13 4
Id. § 86.33.
135 See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
13' 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.34 (1975).
137The following letter was received during the comment period on the subject of
the integration of physical education classes: "The morals of this nation are low enough
now. Please don't make it worse. I pray the time will soon come again when men can be
men and women can be women and each proud of what God made them." N.Y. Times,
Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 5 (city ed.).
138 Id.; 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.34(e) (1975).
139See text accompanying notes 63-77 supra.
140 See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
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can the concept of "unique physical characteristics" justify separate sex education classes. 1 4 1 Nevertheless, HEW's toleration of

separate sex education classes probably will not be challenged.
According to HEW, the tentative existence of sex42 education

classes would be threatened by a forced integration.1
Integration of physical education classes is required, despite
a hostile reaction to the proposed regulations and a move in the
House for a physical education exemption. 43 There should be
no question that separate and unequal physical education programs would violate Title IX. The Project on the Status and

Education of Women has compiled examples of how sex discrimination is manifested in this area.
At a prestigious private institution the women's and

men's physical education departments were separate
and the instructional courses available to female and

male students varied considerably. For example, women
could not take wrestling and men could not take self

defense or volleyball.
At a southern state university female students could not
take coaching courses for credit, with the result that

they were not "qualified" to coach teams.
At an Ohio liberal arts college women majoring in physical education must take a service course each term.

There is no similar requirement for men.
At a Pennsylvania college women must show proficiency

in two sports in order to graduate.
Men need only to
144
show proficiency in one sport.

These examples of different 'treatment accorded male and
45
female students are prohibited by the regulations.
Separate-but-equal physical education programs should also
141 See

Brown, supra note 29, at 893-96.
Action Memorandum from Director of Office for Civil Rights to Secretary of
HEW, June 12, 1973, quoted in DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 847.
143 In November, a Conference Report on H.R. 15580, making appropriations for
the departments of Labor and HEW, attempted to make legislative history for Tide IX to
forestall HEW action in this area. Representative Edith Green expressed the position of
the report: "[It] has just [been] called to my attention that one of the proposed regulations was that all physical education classes had to be integrated. Tide IX was never
designed to have the Federal Government get into the internal operations of how to run
the classes in each and every school in the country ....
120 CONG. REc. 11106 (daily ed.
Nov. 26, 1974).
144 PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WoMEN, supra note 104, at 4-5.
145 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.34 (1975).
142
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be unacceptable. It was suggested above that separate-but-equal
is permissible only within the narrow privacy exception or when
necessary to assure equal opportunities for women. 1 4 6 The exemption for separate locker facilities takes care of any disrobing
problem. 1 47 The arguments for separation that have force in
competitive athletics where ability is the criterion for participation14 8 are not applicable here, since students of all abilities
are included in physical education classes. This is an area where
the risks of inequality are great. Separate treatment discourages
serious athletic interests of women and perpetuates expectations
of low athletic achievement
and denigration by women of their
1 49
own physical abilities.
Business and vocational classes, especially home economics
and shop, are often sex segregated. No longer may a school
offer separate cooking classes where girls are taught to be
homemakers and boys to be chefs.150 In this area also, require15
ments for graduation have differed. In Robinson v. Washington, '
a female student challenged a state board of education regulation requiring one unit of home economics for girls, but not for
boys, as a prerequisite to graduation. In denying the plaintiff's
request for a three judge court, the judge articulated the 'judicial perspective"' 5 2 from which the pursuit of sexual equality has
often been viewed: "[A] judge who enjoys food is hard put to
make a decision in this type of a case. Perhaps he wears his
53
prejudice on his sleeve or in the area of his belt.'
4. Appraisal and Counseling Materials
Some of the more subtle and destructive sex discrimination
in education takes place in the area of counseling. 1 54 The effect
146See text accompanying notes 63-77 supra.
147 40 Fed. Reg. 24141, § 86.33 (1975).
148 See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra and notes 207-19 infra.
149See Fasteau, Giving Women a Sporting Chance, Ms., July, 1973, at 56.
"The phsysically inferior, it turns out, are not women, but any human beings
who do not develop the body's potential-exactly what women have been taught
not to do for centuries. Just how much that indoctrination has cost them is only
now being revealed, as more and more girls challenge the age-old prejudices
defining their physical capacities."
Scott, Closing the Muscle Gap, Ms., Sept., 1974, at 49.
150 But see 120 CONG. Rc. 11106-07 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974) (remarks of Representative Green).

151Civil No. 9576 (W.D. Wash., filed Mar. 22, 1971).
1'2See Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discriminationby Law: A Study in JudicialPerspective, 46

N.Y.U.L. REV. 675 (1971).
'53 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP.,
154

Spring, 1972, at 42.

See 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at 501-10, 435-50, 314-15.
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on a young girl of a counselor's saying that a given career is
inappropriate for her can be irreversible. The results of a vocational guidance test that has been color coded "pink" to direct
female students into careers such as homemaker, nurse, actress,
and model, can determine the career choice of a potential scientist. During the hearings on discrimination against women,
academicians working in this field painted a very dark picture of
a girl's chances of getting adequate career guidance. 1 55 "[T]here
is some evidence, a small but growing body of research and
investigation, that the individual counselor reflects-and his attitudes may even be reinforced by current training programs
-the prejudices and biases of the larger society
relating to
156
choices."'
educational/vocational
her
and
woman
The proposed regulations would have changed only the
most blatant discriminatory practices. A school would not have
been able to use different materials for the two sexes, and tests
that require or permit different treatment of students on the
basis of sex would have been prohibited. 157 The final regulations
have been extended to prohibit discriminatory counseling itself.
Because discriminatory counseling can be difficult to detect,
especially by the counselors, schools are required to reexamine
counseling when a8 single sex predominates in any particular
class or program.,
155
Id.
6
15 Id. 507.

15'39 Fed. Reg. 22228, § 86.34(c) (1974).
15140 Fed. Reg. 24141-42, § 86.36 (1975):
(a) Counseling. A recipient shall not discriminate against any person on the
basis of sex in the counseling or guidance of students or applicants for admission.
(b) Use of appraisal and counseling materials. A recipient which uses testing
or other materials for appraising or counseling students shall not use different
materials for students on the basis of their sex or use materials which permit
or require different treatment of students on such basis unless such different
materials cover the same occupations and interest areas and the use of such
different materials is shown to be essential to eliminate sex bias. Recipients shall
develop and use internal procedures for ensuring that such materials do not
discriminate on the basis of sex. Where the use of a counseling test or other
instrument results in a substantially disproportionate number of members of
one sex in any particular course of study or classification, the recipient shall
take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not
the result of discrimination in the instrument or its application.
(c) Disproportion in classes. Where a recipient finds that a particular class
contains a substantially disproportionate number of individuals of one sex, the
recipient shall take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not the result of discrimination on the basis of sex in counseling or
appraisal materials or by counselors.
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Since the human element is so crucial in this area, educational institutions should probably have been required to conduct training sessions for their counselors to make them more
sensitive to the necessity of approaching female students with the
same open-ended career suggestions offered to males. 15 9 Alice
Fins, of the American Personnel and Guidance Association, focused the problem when relating the reaction of counselors to
women with strong career ambitions: "You'll be getting married
soon. Why this?"' 160 No matter how neutral the materials, reinforcement of sexual stereotypes cannot be eradicated when enforcement of the regulations rests solely in the same school officials who are often unaware of their own discriminatory outlook.
5. Financial and Employment Assistance
The only exceptions to a complete prohibition of different
16
treatment in the area of financial assistance relate to athletics
and to foreign wills, trusts, or provisions by a foreign
government. 1 62 The most obvious scholarship suggested by the
foreign will exemption is the prestigious Rhodes Scholarship.
The only justification offered for the exemption is that the Secretary does not think the statute was intended to cover such
programs.' 6 3 No theoretical reason justifies this assumption.
Title VI contains no such exception.' 64 It is anomalous to allow
one of the most coveted rewards for excellence to be denied a
student on the basis of sex. Harvard and several other institutions have already nominated women who have been rejected
solely on account of sex.' 65 Title IX does not permit such an
exception to its mandate of equality.
There are no apparent loopholes in the employment
guidelines. An educational institution which itself employs stu' See 1970 Hearings, supra note 2, at 501-10.
160Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 1,1974, at 4, col. 5.
16140 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.37(c) (1975):
(1) To the extent that a recipient awards athletic scholarships or grants-inaid, it must provide reasonable opportunities for such awards for members of
each sex in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating in
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.
(2) Separate athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid for members of each sex
may be provided as part of separate athletic teams for members of each sex to
the extent consistent with this paragraph and § 86.41 of this part.
162Id. § 86.37(b).
163 Statement by Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, HEW NEWS, June 3, 1975,
at 3.

164 45

C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)-(iii) (1970).

165 WEAL-ABzUG

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED TITLE

printed in 120 CONG. REc. E 4866 (daily ed. July 18, 1974).
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dents must do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. 166 If an
agency, organization, or person is assisted by a recipient in making employment available to students, the recipient must assure
that such employment is available to both sexes. 16 7 If assurances
are not forthcoming, the recipient may not assist the
and services also
organization. 16 8 Health and insurance benefits
1 69
must be provided equally for both sexes.
6.

Marital or Parental Status

Section 86.40(a) prohibits the application by recipients of
"any rule concerning a student's actual or potential parental,
family, or marital status which treats students differently on the
basis of sex.' 170 The regulation goes on to provide that recipients
may not exclude pregnant students from their education programs or activities "unless the student requests voluntarily to
participate in a separate portion of the program or activity.
. . .)1"'

A recipient may, however, require a pregnant student

who desires to remain in the regular program
to obtain the certification of a physician that the student
is physically and emotionally able to continue participation in the normal education program or activity so long
as such a certification is required of all students for
conditions requiring the atother physical or emotional
72
tention of a physician.1
If a recipient operates a separate program for pregnant students, it must be comparable with the regular program. 7 3 Any
disability related to pregnancy or recovery therefrom must be
treated in the same manner as any other temporary disability
with respect to student medical benefits, and pregnancy must be
treated as a justification for a leave of absence for a period
deemed medically necessary by the student's doctor, "at the conto the status
clusion of which the student shall beu7 reinstated
4
began.'
leave
the
when
held
which she
Although it was suggested above that pregnancy-based clas166 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.38(b) (1975).
167Id.§ 86.38(a).
168 Id.
169Id. § 86.39.
Id. § 86.40(a).
170
17 1 Id.§ 86.40(b)(1).
172
Id. § 86.40(b)(2).
3
17
Id. § 86.40(b)(3).
174
Id. §§ 86.40(b)(4), (5).
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sifications are not absolutely prohibited by Title IX and might be
justified by a showing of educational necessity, l7 5 HEW has determined that exclusion or separation can be justified only under
the specific conditions stated in the regulations. The
Department's judgment, if challenged, will be given great deference by the courts; 17 6 and its judgment seems sound. The expulsion of pregnant teenagers from schools is a serious problem. A
1972 HEW report comments on the policy:
Every year over 200,000 young women under 18
give birth. Usually these young women are expelled
from school at the first sign of pregnancy. Out of
17,000 school districts surveyed in 1970, fewer than one
third offered pregnant school-age girls any education at
all. School districts that did allow students to study during pregnancy usually kept them at home or segregated
them in special classes for various reasons-on moral
grounds, for special protection or for convenience.
Expulsion compounds the already serious problems
of teenage pregnancy. Of every 100 pregnant teenagers
who leave school, 85 never come back. Rejected, cast
out with a child to support and often no salable skills,
these teenagers are nine7 7times more likely to commit
suicide than their peers.'
In Ordway v. Hargraves,7 8 a federal district court ordered a
high school to admit a pregnant student to all classes. Medical
testimony was offered to show that the student herself would be
in no physical danger in attending school; on the contrary, there
was a possibility of mental depression if excluded. 17 9 The plaintiff had not disrupted school activity in any way, and the court
failed to find an educational purpose for the policy.' 8 0 The principal suggested that the policy might have developed from a
desire of the school officials not to appear to condone, and thus
possibly increase the incidence of, pre-marital pregnancy.'18 The
validity of such moral censorship is open to serious question on
first amendment grounds, but even if constitutionally permissi175 See text accompanying notes 49-62 supra.
176Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
177 DAVIDSON, supra note 103, at 867.
1 8 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971).
17aId.
at 1156-57.
18 0
d. at 1157.
8'Ild, at 1158.
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ble, the likelihood of the feared effects is too remote to justify
exclusion.
The two exceptions to the general prohibition against exclusion of pregnant students-student request and physician
certification-can be justified. Since the well-being of the student
should be the primary objective of educational institutions, a
student's desire to separate herself from her peers during her
pregnancy should be honored. A physician's judgment of medical necessity seems also to justify exclusion on this rationale,
where a doctor's certificate is required of all students with other
physical or emotional conditions necessitating medical attention.
This general requirement prevents stigmatization of the excluded pregnant student.
7. Competitive Athletics
Not to have confidence in one's body is to lose confidence in oneself ....
It is precisely the female athletes, who being positively interested in their own game,
feel themselves least handicapped in comparison with
the male. Let her swim, climb mountain peaks, pilot an
airplane, battle against the elements, take risks, go out
for adventure, and she will not feel before the world
that timidity.
1 82
-Simone de Beauvoir.
Probably the most controversial HEW regulations are those
involving equalization of opportunities for men and women in
the area of competitive athletics. 18 3 Athletic associations around
the country complained of the impossibility of complying with
the proposed athletic regulations, 184 claiming that the regulations would destroy collegiate athletics as it is known today. Such
pressure exerted on HEW resulted in the weak athletic section of
the final regulations.
The general prohibition of different treatment according to
sex in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
186
athletics 8 5 is significantly undermined by section 86.41(b).
Whenever the activity involved is a "contact sport," the educational institution may operate separate single-sex teams, whether
182 Loggia,

On the Playing Fields of History, Ms., July, 1973, at 64.
183 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41 (1975).
184
See Comments to the Proposed HEW Regulations, on file with the Region III
Director of the Office for Civil Rights, 3535 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
18540 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(a) (1975).
18
6Id. § 86.41(b).
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on an intramural or competitive level. 1 87 Where non-contact
sports are involved and selection for a team is based on competitive skill, separate teams are also allowed. 18 8 If, however, a school
fields only one team in a non-contact sport, the excluded sex
must be permitted to try out for the single team if athletic opportunity for the excluded sex has previously been limited.' 89
The only check on the discrimination permitted by this section is
the general requirement that the schools provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes. The regulation lists various factors relevant to a determination of the required equality
of opportunity, including unequal aggregate expenditures for
male and female teams.190
One threshold contention of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association [NCAA] is that according to the language of the
statute, sports programs should not be covered at all unless they
receive direct federal funding.' 9 ' The statute provides, "[T]ermination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance . . .
shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part
thereof, in which.., noncompliance has been ...found ....

,,9

The NCAA argues that funds cannot be refused other programs
and activities in a school because of the athletic department's
187

Id.

88

1 Id.
189 Id.
19040 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(c) (1975):

(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are
available the Director will consider, among other factors:
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(ii) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(iii) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(iv) Travel and per diem allowance;
(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(vi) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(vii) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(viii) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(ix) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(x) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate
teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Director may
consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex.
191Statement of the NCAA on Title IX Implementation Regulations, June 26,
1974, on file with the Director of the Office for Civil Rights of Region III, 3535 Market
St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19101; N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1974, at 23, col. 4 (city ed.).
192 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Supp. II, 1972).
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discrimination, since the discrimination must exist in the specific

program being cut off. 1 93 Such a reading of the statute is

plausible, 1 9 4 but HEW takes a broader view. The Department
subjects any program or activity to its requirements "if it receives
95
or benefits from such assistance."'
Another theory through which some organizations hope to
escape the statute is that revenue-producing sports should be
exempted from Title IX. Congresswoman Green reads an exemption into the statute for "intercollegiate sports financed by
gate receipts ..
,196
"..
Representative Abzug, however, warned
that "making a differentiation as to the source of funds could
result in unequal benefits. Thus a man's basketball team . . .
could continue to travel in first-class planes while the women's
basketball team . . . would have to sell cookies to pay for their
transportation.' 9 7 Although there is certainly a difference between activities supported by tuition, fees, or tax dollars and
those financed by gate receipts, HEW does not exempt the latter
from the general prohibition against sex discrimination. It also
seems improbable that many sports would fit into such an exemption since account would have to be taken of the funds that
may be "'hidden' in the institution's budget in a number of
ways-maintenance on the stadium, practice gyms and fields;
'93 Some of the stronger protests, notably by the NCAA, have provoked congressional reaction to the new regulations. On July 8, 1975, H.R. 8395 was introduced, a
measure that "would allow revenue-producing sports to use their profits to maintain
their own teams before diverting any profits to other men's teams and women's teams."
33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REPT. 1484 (July 12, 1975). For further discussion of congressional
efforts to block or amend the athletics regulations, see id. 1484-85. As of this writing H.R.
8395 was tentatively scheduled for hearings in September, 1975. Id. 1672 (Aug. 2, 1975).
4
19 See DAvIDSON, supra note 103, at 872: "Unlike Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provides for sanctions limited to the noncomplying unit or program, Executive Order sanctions may be directed at the university or college as a whole."
195 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975) (introductory material) (emphasis supplied). Both
HEW and NCAA rely for their interpretations on Board of Public Instruction v. Finch,
414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). This case construes parallel language of Title VI, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970), which provides: "[T]ermination or refusal ... shall be limited in
its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which... noncompliance has been
... found .... "
The court called for individualized consideration of the use of funds of each grant
statute but noted that a program may be "so affected by discriminatory practices elsewhere in the school system that it thereby becomes discriminatory." 414 F.2d at 1079.
Athletic departments may be able to argue that they have not infected the environment
sufficiently to cause other programs to lose funding; the burden, however, should at
least be on the recipient to demonstrate the lack of effect on other programs.
196 120 CONG. REc. 11107 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1974), (remarks of Representative
Green).
197

'

at 13.

Id. 11108; see PROJECT

ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN,

supra note 104,
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health care provided by the university health service; salaries of
1 98
coaches or trainers"; athletic scholarships, etc.
One highly questionable provision is section 86.41(c):
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each
sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams
if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will
not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the
Director may consider the failure to provide necessary
funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of
opportunity for members of each sex.' 99
One might argue that the decision not to require equal aggregate expenditures is justified, because even after opportunities
are equalized fewer girls will participate in competitive athletics
than boys. Also some sports are more expensive to equip than
others. If one sex predominates on such teams, total expenditures will be unequal. However, if the assumption is that girls are
not as interested as boys and will not come out for competitive
athletics in the same numbers, one must look to the reasons for
this lack of interest. One major reason must be past discrimination. If all through school girls have had no training, no access to
gyms and equipment, no "encouragement" to participate, it is
age of
hardly a justification for unequal expenditures that at the
20 0
sixteen they are not as interested in sports as are boys.
Without an equal expenditure requirement it is difficult to
see how HEW will evaluate the equality of sports programs. The
warning has come that an equal expenditure approach would
change the face of intercollegiate athletics. 20 1 But that is just the
purpose of Title IX-to prevent the tuition, fees, and tax dollars
of women students and taxpayers from being used to benefit
only men. It is true that resources are finite; Title IX does not
mandate spending money that does not exist. But it does demand spending available funds without discrimination on the
basis of sex. Surely the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v.
Nichols 20 2 cost the San Francisco Unified School District some
money. And Brown v. Board of Education20 3 changed the face of
198 PROJECT ON THE STATUS AND EDUCATION OF WOMEN, supra note 104, at 13; see
Dunkle, College Athletics: Tug-of-Warfor the Purse Strings, Ms., Sept., 1974, at 114.
19940 Fed. Reg. 24143, § 86.41(c) (1975).
200See Fasteau, supra note 149, at 57.
201 See Comments to the Proposed HEW Regulations, on file with the Region III
Director of the Office for Civil Rights, 3535 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19101.
202 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
203 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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education in the South. If such be the result of implementing the
will of Congress, educators and athletic organizations must face
that reality, and proceed forthwith to reevaluate the use of their
resources with the goal in mind of developing the physical wellbeing of female and male students.
Questions about the applicability of the separate-but-equal
doctrine inevitably arise in this area. The regulations allow:
separate teams for members of each sex where selection
for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the
activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a
recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular
sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors
no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic
opportunities for members of that sex have previously
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport
involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this
part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice
hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purmajor activity of which involves bodily
pose of20 [sic]
4
contact.
Earlier it was argued that under Title IX there should be only
two justifications for separate treatment based on sex: to implement the explicit, narrow living facilities exception, or to assure
equal access to certain activities. 20 5 The narrow construction of
the living facilities exception discussed earlier in the Comment
does not justify separate treatment in the context of competitive
athletics beyond the provision of separate locker room
facilities.20 6 Thus, only separation necessary to assure equal access for women can be justified.
The acceptability under Title IX of fielding separate male
and female teams in a particular sport should depend on the age
40 Fed. Reg. 24142-43, § 86.41(b) (1975). HEW explains:
Where selection is based on competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact
sport, athletics may be provided through separate teams for males and females or
through a single team open to both sexes. If separate teams are offered, a
recipient institution may not discriminate on the basis of sex in provision of
necessary equipment or supplies, or in any other way, but equal aggregate expenditures are not required. The goal of the final regulation in the area of athletics is to
secure equal opportunity for males and females while allowing schools and
colleges flexibility in determining how best to provide such opportunity.
HEW, Fact Sheet 6 (June, 1975).
205 Text accompanying notes 74-77 supra.
2 06
See text accompanying notes 32-37 supra.
204

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:806

level of the students involved. It might be argued that there are
sufficient physiological differences between the sexes not only to
justify but to mandate separate-but-equal in this context. Where
boys are physically stronger and larger than girls, Lau and Griggs
alert us to the danger of impermissible de facto exclusion of girls
from teams selected on the basis of competitive skill. 20 7 In such a
situation separate teams might be not merely acceptable, but
mandatory, to prevent unequal access to competitive athletic
8
activities.

20

A full medical evaluation of the physical differences between men and women is well beyond the scope of this Comment. Yet some discussion of those differences is necessary to set
standards for deciding when Title IX permits separate teams for
girls and boys. Whatever the physical differences between girls
and boys, they clearly increase as children get older.
[T]hroughout childhood, boys and girls are roughly
similar in size, strength, and reaction times. Girls aged 9
to 12 are, if anything, larger and stronger than their
male peers because their bone structure and musculature begin developing earlier and mature by age 12 or
13. Boys do not generally achieve the same stage of
development until age 14, 15, or 16.209
Medical evidence to this effect convinced the New Jersey Supreme Court to uphold a finding by the New Jersey Division on
Civil Rights that girls of eight to twelve are not as a class subject
to greater hazard of injury than boys and therefore must be
allowed to play Little League baseball. 210 It appears, then, that
medical evidence does not justify athletic separation of the sexes
before the junior high school level. 2 1 1 If before junior high
school some sports end up being predominantly of one sex because of personal preferences, there would be no violation of
Title IX. But mandatory separation of the sexes in sports should
not be allowed below the junior high school level unless substantial evidence indicates that failure to maintain separate teams
207 See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
208 See Fasteau, supra note 149, at 103. For analyses of the constitutional adjudication
in this area and possible ways to eradicate sex discrimination in athletics, see Comment,
Equality in Athletics: the Cheerleaderv. the Athlete, 19 S.D.L. REv. 428 (1974); Comment, Sex
Discriminationin InterscholasticHigh School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. Rv. 535 (1974).
209 Scott, supra note 149, at 50.
210 NOW, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522,
318 A.2d 33 (1974).
211 Fasteau, supra note 149, at 58.
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will, because of physical differences, result in the de facto exclusion of girls from the particular competitive sport in question.
At adolescence, physical differences increase and might well
support the conclusion that separate teams should be permitted
lest girls receive less benefits than boys. "[Y]oung men are on the
average about 10 percent larger than young women, and their
muscle mass is about twice that of girls. They perform two to
four times as well in test of strength .... -212 These differences
should not be overemphasized. "Evidence shows that the difference in strength between trained male and female athletes
is far less than that between average or untrained men and
women." 213 Nevertheless, at present the gross disparity in training and conditioning and the undeniable physical differences
between the sexes allow separate teams beginning at the junior
high school level. The regulations, of course, permit them at
every level.214
The regulations do not, however, require separate teams at
any level. If a school maintains a single team in a non-contact
sport without providing a separate female team in the sport,
women must be permitted to try out for that single team. 215 The
regulations do not imply that a single, non-contact-sport team
for which women may try out per se satisfies the requirements of
section 86.41.216 If under an open tryout system interested
women are in fact excluded, the single team arrangement may
not satisfy the "equal opportunity" requirements of section
86.41(c). 2 17 This interpretation is consistent with the general

212

21

Scott, supra note 149, at 50.

3Id. 49. Women are catching up to men in international competitions such as track

and swimming. At the 1924 Olympic games, men's time in the 400-meter freestyle was 16
percent faster than women's; 11.66 percent faster in 1948; and only 7.3 percent faster in
1972 at Munich. Id.
214 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(b) (1975).
215/vfany young women have obtained injunctions to force their schools and athletic
associations to allow them to try out for non-contact sports for which there was no girls'
team. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Reed v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972). Contra Bucha v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. 111.1972). The complaints generally charged violation of fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection. In Brenden the Eighth Circuit
examined the interest of the student in competing in interscholastic athletics and that of
the high school in assuring that persons with similar qualifications compete among themselves, and found no "sufficient rational basis for concluding that women are incapable of
competing with men in non-contact sports." 477 F.2d at 1300.
216 See Statement of Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of HEW, HEW News, June 3,
1975, at 4.
217 40 Fed. Reg. 24142, § 86.41(c) (1975).
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principles suggested earlier. 2 18 Thus, if teams theoretically open
to all on a competitive basis result in exclusion of women from
athletic participation, separate teams for women may be required
by the regulation and are certainly required by the statute
itself.2 1 9
The general framework developed earlier 220 indicates that
separate contact-sport teams are justifiable in no more situations
than are separate teams for non-contact sports. It might be argued that privacy should justify separating boys and girls in conthe living facilities exceptact sports. As noted earlier, 2however,
21
tion does not extend this far.
Safety is often advanced as an additional reason for sex
segregation in contact sports. But, "[a]s one proponent for the
integration of contact sports puts it: 'If we are worried about
girls' breasts and internal organs, then give them chest and belly
protectors. We haven't spared our male football players any expense in that department.' ",222 Male athletes, no less than
female, may get hurt playing certain sports. In the team selection process girls not sturdy enough to play successfully will be
weeded out as are weak boys. Girls must be able to decide for
themselves whether or not the rewards of playing certain sports
are greater than the possibility of injury. Boys of all levels of
strength and ability play all types of intra-mural sports. This
situation may be compared to Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co. ,223 where the court held that calling ajob strenuous
would not disallow a woman from making her own decision on
whether the effort of the job was worth the pay and other advantages. Women can no longer be "protected" by rules and regulations that for the most part discriminate against them.
If separate teams are justified to prevent de facto exclusion
of women from competitive sports, the next question is whether
female athletes should nonetheless be allowed to try out for the
men's team in this separate-but-equal situation. People dedicated
to equalizing opportunities for women and knowledgeable in the
area of athletics disagree to such an extent on this question that
judgment should be left to individual schools. Brenda Feigen
Fasteau would not allow women to "compete up" because of the
"' See text accompanying notes 43-48, 75-76 supra.
Id.
220 See text accompanying notes 206-07 supra.
22
1See text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
222 Fasteau, supra note 149, at 103.
223 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
2 19
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potential unfairness to men who could possibly make the
women's team but not the men's. 22 4 "Even more importantly, it
cheats the women's team which would lose its best athletes to the
225
male squads, thus setting women's sports back even farther.
If an equally well-equipped girls' team is available, the question
of "competing up" should be left to recipients. This is the approach apparently taken in the regulations.
Even if a difference in competitive athletic opportunities
passes muster under sections 86.41(a) and (b),226 it can still be
challenged under the multifactor test of section 86.41(c). 2 27 For
example, if a school sponsors all-male football, basketball, boxing, and wrestling teams but no teams at all for girls, no attack
can be made under sections 86.41(a) and (b).22 s This arrangement, however, is clearly subject to challenge under the "equal
athletic opportunity" requirement of section 86.41(c). 229 It is difficult to predict how challenges to less blatant discrimination
will fare when the Director considers the ten factors listed in
subsection (c).
IV.

CONCLUSION

Title IX's general prohibition of sex discrimination in education should be construed broadly, and the limited living
facilities exception narrowly, in order to effect the remedial
purpose of the statute. There is no justification for most sexbased discrimination in education. The living facilities exception
should be limited to living quarters, restrooms, locker facilities,
and other areas where disrobing takes place. The only justification for separation of the sexes other than privacy is to assure
access to a program or activity for both male and female students. This justification will operate only in the area of competitive athletics.
The HEW regulations adhere to this analysis fairly closely.
Their breadth fits in well with judicial construction of Titles VI
and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In controversial areas
such as athletics, however, the Department has attempted a middle course. The result is ambiguous requirements, which will
Fasteau, supra note 149 at 103.
Id.
226 40 Fed. Reg. 24142-43, §§ 86.41(a), (b) (1975).
227
Id. § 86.41(c).
228
Id. §§ 86.41(a), (b).
229
d. § 86.41(c).

224
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make enforcement difficult. Nevertheless, HEW's conscientious
oversight of educational institutions receiving federal financial
assistance should have a great influence in removing sex discrimination from the educational system.

